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This book is written in commemoration of Karel Jansen. It 
was originally planned as a Liber Amicorum for his retire-
ment in 2011 to honour a valued and productive colleague, 
teacher and researcher. After Karel’s sudden death the con-
tributors decided to do just that and go on with the produc-
tion of this volume of short essays. The essays in combina-
tion provide a good picture of the topics in which Karel was 
involved during his career at ISS that started in 1975. 
We have organized the contributions of thirteen friends and 
colleagues that make up this volume into five sections that 
cover the scientific topics that have always interested Karel: 
money, the Asian NICS, the micro-macro paradox, global 
institutions, and financial crises. The five sections cluster 
essays that deal with a perspective that was characteristic 
of the scientific work of Karel. This chapter and the next 
chapter by Arjun Bedi provide an introduction and a more 
general overview.
As Arjun Bedi writes in Chapter 2, Karel joked that his last 
year at ISS ended on a high research note, as he was well 
aware that important publications would appear in 2011. It is 
true that the harvest was particularly good in 2011, but it is 
also true that Karel has had several periods of high scientific 
productivity with lasting impact. This is clear from the list of 
his publications that appears in the appendices. Karel not 
only managed to get published, he was also widely read and 
quoted. Importantly, Karel’s publications have had a strong 
impact in the international scientific discourse. Table 1 lists 
the ten publications that have been quoted most often in 
the international literature. Also by modern bibliometric 
standards the cluster on the Thai miracle unambiguously 
should be labelled as a fundamental contribution. Another 
important scientific legacy consists of the supervision of 
seven PhDs. Many of these PhDs were embedded in Karel’s 
research agenda that was also linked to his project and ad-
visory work. Actually in many ways his approach to research 
provides a very concrete answer to some recent questions 
that ISS has been asking itself about the management of 
research and the development of research themes.1 “Follow 
your instinct”, “keep the bureaucrats in the dark”, “manage 
your time efficiently” and “ignore distractions” would sum 
up the best practices that we all learned from his down to 
earth approach.
Money and development
Karel’s approach was particularly effective in relation to the 
Money and Finance for Development Project to which Part 
I on Money alludes. The three contributors to Part I worked 
intensively with Karel on this project. Valpy FitzGerald 
I ntroduction: Do we ever learn?
Peter A.G. van Bergeijk  
6 Liber Amicorum
sketches how Karel introduced modern monetary economics 
to ISS, organized a seminal international conference on the 
theme of finance and development and built a large team 
of bright and young students. Rob Vos argues the current 
case for capital controls, a topic that is in line with Karel’s 
1997 assessment that governments need to reregulate in 
order to face up to capital flow volatility. Luis Carlos Jemio, 
who worked on the project between 1988 and 1993 as a PhD 
student (supervised by Karel) and later as a post doc, shares 
observations on the extent and impact of financial volatil-
ity in developing countries, including his experience as Min-
ister of Finance of Bolivia.
Vietnam and poverty reduction
Part II contains contibutions that deal with poverty reduc-
tion in Vietnam. The choice to focus on Vietnam is obvious 
since Karel stayed in Vietnam as Resident Advisor of the 
Vietnam-ISS project at the University of Economics in Ho Chi 
Title Year Cites
1 The macroeconomic effects of direct foreign investment: The case of Thailand 1995 65
2 External finance in Thailand’s development: An interpretation of Thailand’s 
growth boom
1997 43
3 External constraints on private investment decisions in developing countries 1994 31
4 Finance, growth and stability: financing economic development in Thailand, 
1960-86
1990 24
5 Thailand: The making of a miracle? 2001 24
6 Thailand: The next NIC? 1991 24
7 International capital flows and economic adjustment in Thailand 1993 19
8 Agrarian Transition in Viet Nam. Sectoral activities programme 1998 14
9 Sustainability: Necessity for a prosperous society 2005 14
10 External finance, growth and adjustment: A computable general equilibrium 
model for Thailand
1993 14
Table 1 Top 10 of most cited publications by Karel Jansen
Source: calculations with Publish and Perish software, accessed December 2011
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Minh City. Max Spoor focuses on the possibility of inclusive 
growth, poverty reduction and income inequality, arguing 
that the Vietnam experience may provide interesting lessons 
for China, which faces the same challenges. Le Tan Nghiem 
and Arjun S. Bedi are more cautious: “It is quite possible 
and has indeed been recorded elsewhere, that similar policy 
changes in other contexts may have worsened poverty and 
inequality”. Based on micro-data they argue that macro 
economic policies appear to be crucial for the success of risk 
diversification efforts at the household level.
It is micro and macro, stupid!
Part III  discusses this micro-macro paradox in more detail. 
Syed Mansoob Murshed provides a perspective on meth-
odology and the history of thought. His conclusion is clear: 
from the policy-oriented approach to which Karel adhered it 
would not make sense to neglect the perspective from ei-
ther micro or macro economics. It is often jokingly asserted 
that policy needs one-handed economists in order to avoid 
the “on the one hand, on the other hand” indeterminacy 
that characterizes much academic work. But according to 
Karel’s philosophy a one sided (micro or macro) economist 
could provide dangerously wrong advice. Veronica B. Bay-
angos deals with one of the topics in which the micro-macro 
paradox is evident (and which is also the subject of her 2011 
article co-authored with Karel): remittances have a positive 
impact on economic well-being, but at the same time re-
duce macroeconomic competitiveness.
Global institutions under fire
Part IV offers tribute to Karel’s critical stance on the global 
financial institutions and their analysis which all too often 
has been driven by mainstream considerations. Djalita Fi-
alho discusses the topic of her PhD thesis (which Karel was 
supervising): the critical analysis of the stated reasons for 
the creation of the category of Least Developed Countries. 
(During the preparation of the dissertation design seminar 
Karel shared the memory that UNESCO, where he worked in 
the 1970s, suddenly introduced the LDC phenomenon in its 
official publications, an acronym that is now part and parcel 
of UN-speak.) Howard Nicholas meticulously criticizes IMF 
reports on Surinamese inflation that have difficulty grasping 
the relationship between money stock and inflation. Does 
IMF staff ignore macroeconomic evidence that does not 
fit in its vision of the world or is this a case of using differ-
ent standards and measures for developed and developing 
countries?
Never waste a financial crisis
Part V deals with an evergreen that became topical again in 
2008-2009. Karel foresaw the implications early on and in the 
November 2008 issue of DevISSues he wrote:
Since the Asian crisis in 1997 I have been teaching 
about financial crises. My examples were develop-
ing countries like Mexico, Thailand, and Argentina. 
In my next course I will have to shift my focus as 
today arguably the biggest financial crisis ever is 
unfolding in the USA and Europe.
Geske Dijkstra discusses the Greek debt crisis. Clearly les-
sons from development economics are relevant for this 
EMU member country. Rolph van der Hoeven builds on one 
of Karel’s last publications analysing the political economy 
impact on the labour market in the developing world. Peter 
van Bergeijk, dealing with trade finance, reflects on how the 
crisis was used in teaching at ISS.
Do we ever learn?
Karel Jansen was an unconventional critical economist. A 
scientist who built and spread substantial economic knowl-
edge that is both fundamental in a scientific sense and fun-
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damental for policy makers who operate at the interface of 
development and finance. Karel is described in this volume 
as a friend, mentor, teacher, advisor, the benevolent uncle, 
but most of all as someone with a positive attitude and a 
strong belief in the good of mankind. The title of this liber 
amoricum derives from his last publication, “Thailand from 
crisis to crisis: do we ever learn?”. At the end of that chapter 
Karel answers his own question in the affirmative. Lessons 
are learned, institutions are created and private and public 
policies are adjusted. Crises will occur, argues Karel, but 
there is also an upside as they provide a learning experi-
ence. In the end, Karel believed, humanity learns. Humanity 
learns through critical science. Science as reflected in the 
contributions in this volume. Science that Karel liked.
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I interacted with Karel for the past twelve and a half years as 
a member of the Economics of Development Group at ISS. I 
also worked with him for the past decade or so on two teach-
ing programmes in Vietnam, and in December 2010 I had the 
pleasure of meeting Karel and Carry, along with my family, in 
Ho Chi Minh City. We also worked on the same floor of the 
ISS building and went to the same bar after various econom-
ics research seminars.    
Karel’s research work focused on international finance and 
development and he was particularly concerned about the 
effects of macroeconomic policies, foreign direct invest-
ment and remittances on the stability of developing coun-
try economies. He ran an extremely successful research 
programme titled, ‘Money, Finance and Development’ for 
almost fifteen years. In part through this programme, Karel 
leaves behind a strong research legacy in the form of books 
and articles for which he will be remembered and quoted. 
For an academic there is probably no greater joy than being 
quoted and referenced by peers. His legacy also includes 
seven PhD students whom Karel promoted and supervised. 
These former students, and the body of work which Karel 
leaves behind, carry the imprint of his innovative thinking on 
macroeconomic issues. 
For many years, Karel also served as an editor of the Journal 
of Development Studies, one of the best known and respect-
ed journals in our field. His latest paper (with a former PhD 
student, Veronica Bayangos) was on remittances as a source 
of external finance in the Philippines and was published in 
2011 in World Development — a top ranked journal.  On the 
day before he passed away he was in my office and was very 
pleased that he was ending his career on a high research 
note, with several papers and chapters slated for publication. 
We counted his research points together and joked that he 
could now apply for promotion. 
An achievement that Karel was proud of was his work on 
the Vietnam-ISS Masters in Development Economics Pro-
grammes in Ho Chi Minh City and in Hanoi. The two MA pro-
grammes are still running and are shining examples of ca-
pacity building programmes that the ISS and the Netherlands 
can be proud of. In preparation for his retirement, in his last 
e-mail to colleagues in Vietnam and to me he wrote: 
I have been involved in the MDE from the first day, 
as have some of you, and I feel pleased and proud 
over what has been achieved. As you will remember 
during the first phase of the project, when the Dutch 
government was supporting the MDE, the sponsor’s 
Karel Jansen – No punches pulled 
Arjun Singh Bedi 
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main concern was with sustainability: will the pro-
ject survive once Dutch financial support falls away? 
The MDE has been exceptionally successful in this 
respect. Almost ten years after the end of Dutch 
support the MDE is as strong as ever. It is particu-
larly gratifying to note that the project which initially 
needed strong external support is now carried out 
almost entirely by Vietnamese staff (Karel Jansen, e-
mail, 23 April 2011).
He went on to state:
I have enjoyed working with you on the MDE and 
although I stop working for the ISS the MDE will al-
ways remain in my heart and I will continue to follow 
its progress (Karel Jansen, e-mail, 23 April 2011).
These feelings were reciprocated and the director of the pro-
gramme in Hanoi writes:
We were deeply saddened to hear about Profes-
sor Karel Jansen passing away. Our lecturers, staff 
and students will never forget the nice memories of 
working with him, his kindness and wonderful smile 
(Mai Nguyen, e-mail, 3 May 2011).
Karel served as chair of our staff group for six years. He took 
over at a time when the staff group was riven by internal con-
flict. His no-nonsense, ‘I suffer no fools’, even-handed and 
fair approach contributed to the creation of a cohesive group 
that enjoys a strong teaching and research profile. He had an 
eye for talent and successfully recruited new academics for 
the staff group. 
On a personal note, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Ka-
rel; during his tenure as chair he evaluated my performance 
several times and was instrumental in the development of 
my career. I also succeeded him as chair of the staff group 
and when in doubt, which was often, I used to turn to him. 
He could always be counted upon for unusual, unexpected, 
sharp and insightful assessments.  I shall miss this. 
However, his management legacy will also live on as we did 
learn several tricks from him. For instance, ‘ignore e-mails for 
a while and the problems will take care of themselves’ or his 
advice, while developing projects, to ‘keep the institute’s bu-
reaucracy in the dark as long as possible’.  
Karel gave our group strength and I will remember him as 
‘our tough guy’. If we wanted something to be said clearly 
and without any doubt about our intentions, Karel provided 
the firepower. 
Karel will be warmly remembered and respected for his long 
years of dedicated professional contribution to the ISS and to 
development studies, his insights as an economist and as a 
clear-thinking individual who pulled no punches. 
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Part I 
Money and 
develoPMent
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I first met Karel at the ‘old’ Institute — the Wittebrug Hotel 
in Badhuisweg — and we began to work together in the 
early 1980s. It was Karel who introduced modern monetary 
economics to the ISS which then led to the Institute becom-
ing an internationally recognized centre of expertise in de-
velopment finance in the 1990s. In a real sense, therefore, I 
have always felt that I learned much more from him, than he 
did from me.
In the early 1980s, Karel invited to The Hague a series of 
eminent experts in the field of monetary economics, which 
at the time seemed quite foreign to development econom-
ics. Monetary economists considered developing countries 
to have fiscal rather than monetary economies; while devel-
opment economists regarded monetary theory as irrelevant 
at best (inflation being the consequence of supply bottle-
necks) and ‘monetarists’ as destructive of industrialization 
and poverty reduction, at worst.
Karel — rightly — felt otherwise. He believed that monetary 
theory could be adapted to the economic structures of poor 
and middle-income countries by careful analysis; and that 
many of the disequilibria that reduce growth and induce 
crises have monetary roots. This is now an accepted view, 
but then it was a novel one.
Having invited the eminent speakers (who included Robert 
Mundell) to his lecture series, he published their contribu-
tions in the book he edited in 1983, Monetarism, Economic 
Crisis and the Third World (London, Frank Cass). But Karel 
still had to finish his own doctoral dissertation in 1988 based 
on his fieldwork in Thailand. It was defended with great suc-
cess and admiration on the part of his examiners (of whom I 
was one) and rapidly published in 1990 as Finance, Growth 
and Stability in Thailand 1960–86 (Aldershot, Avebury).  Even 
before finishing his thesis his reputation in the field was such 
that he was invited to the founding conference of the United 
Nations University World Institute of Development Econom-
ics Research (UNU/WIDER) in 1986 in Helsinki
In combination with his later study on the macroeconomics 
of external finance in 1997 — External Finance in Thailand’s 
Development (Basingstoke, Macmillan) — he provided the 
most thorough and rigorous interpretation of the macroeco-
nomics of the Thai ‘economic miracle’ available, texts which 
are still obligatory reading for all those in the field.  
Convinced that similar detailed analysis of other developing 
economies would lead to important comparative findings 
and a distinct approach to the impact of external finance 
— development aid, private investment and bank lending — 
Monetary economics and development
Valpy FitzGerald  
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on emerging market economies, Karel engaged in an enor-
mously successful series of applications to research councils 
and the Dutch international cooperation agency in order to 
fund more research in this field at the ISS. 
The result was the ‘Money and Finance Project’ which be-
came a cornerstone of the Institute’s economics reputation, 
and which allowed The Hague to gain a key position in 
Dutch development economics, previously dominated by 
Rotterdam, and from there an international standing. As well 
as two colleagues (Rob Vos and myself), Karel built a large 
team of bright young research assistants and a fleet of PhD 
students, all of whom he supported like a benevolent uncle.
The project provided a unique analysis — based on simula-
tion models, econometric studies and applied theory — of 
the interaction between external finance in all its forms on 
the one hand, and domestic growth and income distribution 
on the other. A series of working papers, journal articles and 
even a dedicated book series with Macmillan, flowed from 
this project, which spanned three continents and a dozen 
countries. The culmination of this effort was Karel’s edited 
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volume External Finance and Adjustment: Failure and Suc-
cess in the Developing World, published by Macmillan in 
1997. 
Karel was also an outstandingly good teacher. He would pa-
tiently set out the building blocks of economics, making sure 
his students understood each one before moving on to the 
next, and gradually build up the edifice. In consequence, his 
students learnt not only rigorous monetary theory but also 
how to recognize its assumptions and limitations, and thus 
were able to adopt his analysis to their own country taking 
into account its structural characteristics. No wonder they 
were so devoted to him. And indeed, reading his prose you 
can almost hear him speaking.
The team went on to other things by the end of the 1990s — 
Rob Vos to Washington and New York and myself to Oxford. 
Karel also decided on a change of course, returning to his 
beloved Thailand and then to Viet Nam. Here he built up 
a high quality teaching programme, and eventually indig-
enous research capacity as well, in development economics.  
In this last stage of his intellectual life, Karel left behind a 
generation of young Vietnamese development economists 
who revered him as an intellectual parent, and I am sure con-
tributed to the outstanding economic success of Viet Nam. 
This was Karel’s way of influencing policy: not through high 
level ministerial briefings, or IMF reports, but rather through 
the patient training of young economists.
In my opinion — and that of his close colleagues — Karel 
should have been recognized by the ISS with a full profes-
sorship for his contributions to teaching, research and ca-
pacity building. Certainly many lesser scholars have been so 
honoured. But those in academic authority did not see fit to 
do so — indeed there were even some signs of resentment 
at the academic success and policy influence of the Money 
& Finance Project. But it was not Karel’s way to campaign in 
his own interest.  
This lack of public recognition Karel accepted with resigna-
tion, as one would put up with bad weather or a delayed 
train. Perhaps, too, he understood that the respect of col-
leagues and students is what counts in the end.  
However, it is as a warm human person that I most want to 
remember Karel. His smile and gentle sense of humour. His 
endless patience with the obstacles of official bureaucracy, 
with the endless demands of students and with the unreli-
ability of colleagues. He always had time for a beer and gen-
tle conversation to wind down after a difficult day. 
Karel had a stoical attitude to life, and an ironic view of the 
world; but without a trace of cynicism or pessimism. He 
believed in the potential for good in human nature and the 
ability of sensible people to make the world a better place. 
Karel was — and indeed remains — a friend in the deepest 
sense of the word. Someone you did not need to impress, 
nor needy of praise. He was always there for you when you 
needed help, but made few if any demands on others. His 
friendship was extended with equal generosity to eminent 
professors and struggling students.
We will all miss him, but he retains a place in our hearts.
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When Karel and I put together a volume on international 
finance and macroeconomic policy making in developing 
countries in the early 1990s,2 we lived in an era where the 
mainstream policy view was to limit the number of both 
objectives and policy instruments for developing countries. 
Under the wings of the Washington Consensus, developing 
countries were advised to narrow macroeconomic policies 
to target stability (inflation, exchange rate, fiscal balance), 
often to the detriment of broader development objectives. 
The shift towards flexible exchange rates, financial deregula-
tion and capital account opening, limited the range of policy 
instruments at the disposal of governments and exposed 
countries, especially middle-income countries, to volatile 
international financial markets. Among others, Karel wrote 
the fourth chapter of the volume we edited, on “External 
Finance, Investment and Growth”, in which he outlined the 
macroeconomic policy challenges in managing different 
types of capital flows in developing countries, suggesting 
— against the grain of the time — that developing country 
governments should enhance their toolbox to face up to 
capital flow volatility, rather than stick to the single hammer 
approach preached by the Washington Consensus.
He was, as usual, ahead of his time. Recently, a renewed 
consensus has emerged on the need to re-regulate inter-
national capital movements. Also the IMF has recognized 
this need in recent policy papers presented to its executive 
board.3 In the 1990s, the IMF had systematically recom-
mended against the use of capital controls (even though 
it was in contravention of Article IV of the IMF Articles of 
Agreement). Now it sees capital controls can help countries 
better hedge against capital flow volatility under certain con-
ditions. Indeed, in recent years several countries, including 
Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, introduced measures 
to contain surges and reversals in short-term capital move-
ments.
Bubble, bubble, toil and trouble
After collapsing in 2008, international capital flows to devel-
oping and emerging economies increased again, stemming 
from the abundant liquidity from developed country central 
banks at close-to-zero interest rates, on the one hand, and 
the stronger economic recovery in developing countries, on 
the other. As in many previous episodes, instead of provid-
Increasing policy space by adding instruments:  
The case for capital controls 
Rob Vos
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ing long-term productive investment, much of the inflows 
appear to be financing real estate and consumption, and 
there is some evidence that they are already leading to new 
bubbles in domestic markets. In mid-2011, there was a sud-
den reversal in capital flows as international investors pulled 
back money to reinvest in financial safe havens, such as the 
US dollar and the Swiss franc, amidst the turmoil caused by 
sovereign debt problems in the euro zone and the United 
States.
International capital flows in general and to developing 
countries in particular have exhibited boom and bust cycles 
over the past few decades, increasing during expansionary 
periods and falling during periods of economic slowdowns. 
Pro-cyclical capital flows — particularly short-term flows — 
played a role in most of the crises in the developing world 
since the 1980s. Contrary to the original expectation that 
capital market liberalization would increase long-term invest-
ment in poor countries, the majority of the inflows inflated 
finance bubbles, which burst when capital flows reversed 
following changed market perceptions of investors.
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Volatile capital flows have also made traditional macroeco-
nomic policy instruments less effective. In general, govern-
ments increase spending and lower interest rates in the face 
of an economic slowdown. However, open capital markets 
make these policies more difficult to implement. Central 
banks may be forced to raise interest rates to stop capital 
outflows during a crisis or economic slowdown, causing fis-
cal deficits to widen as the cost of borrowing increases, es-
pecially in countries where governments hold large amounts 
of short-term debt. There is a similar dynamic during booms. 
With more capital flowing in, interest rates fall, inflating the 
money supply. If monetary authorities respond by raising 
interest rates to combat the boom, they run the risk of at-
tracting even more short-term speculative capital, further 
increasing the money supply and thus failing to take air out 
of the financial bubble. Moreover, the capital inflows put 
upward pressure on the exchange rate, making exports less 
competitive.
Managing the capital account…
Countries have a range of policy instruments at their dispos-
al to manage cross-border capital flows. Three categories of 
responses are usually distinguished: macroeconomic poli-
cies, macro-prudential measures and other forms of capital 
account management, including capital flow regulations. 
Capital account regulations should be an essential part of a 
broader counter-cyclical macro-prudential risk management 
of the domestic financial sector, and should not be viewed 
any differently than regulation of domestic risks. Such regu-
lations — which include price and quantity regulations, 
including taxes, reserve requirements, minimum investment 
periods and quantitative limits on certain types of cross-
border capital transactions — directly target capital flows, 
whereas macro-tools focus on overall economic variables 
and the domestic regulatory framework.
The present IMF position is that capital account regula-
tions should be employed only when macroeconomic and 
prudential policy measures are not sufficient to counter the 
negative impact of capital inflows. However, the textbook 
response of dealing with capital inflows by letting foreign 
exchange rates appreciate and slashing fiscal spending is 
often inadequate and can have negative side effects. Letting 
the exchange rate strengthen can penalize export-oriented 
sectors, thus impacting growth and development, while fis-
cal cuts can be costly, and the slow speed of fiscal decision-
making makes it an ineffective policy tool for dealing with 
short-term volatile capital inflows. Instead, adopting regula-
tions at an early stage could help limit capital inflows before 
asset bubbles and other risks to the economy materialize. 
Mainstream economists often also argue that, if they are 
to be instated, capital controls should be temporary. But 
there is a case to be made for permanent regimes, espe-
cially given the recurrent volatility in international capital 
movements. Since capital flows can change rapidly, policy 
makers may need to be able to react swiftly, which is easier 
in a permanent regime of capital-account regulation. Such 
a permanent regime could be adjusted to the country’s cir-
cumstances. In this way, policies could be re-enacted quickly 
in a counter-cyclical fashion, and market actors would not be 
caught off-guard if capital-account regulations have to be 
reintroduced.
Measures should also be tailored (that is made forceful 
enough) to live up to the challenge. Brazil’s recent experi-
ence provides a meaningful example. Brazil introduced a 2 
per cent tax on fixed-income foreign investment in October 
2009 and increased it a year later to 6 per cent. These meas-
ures did not prevent a strong surge in equity investments 
leading to a strong appreciation of the Brazilian real by 25 
per cent and neither did it prevent a strong reversal from 
mid-2011 during the increased global risk aversion of the 
third quarter of 2011, when the real devalued by 16 per cent 
in a few weeks’ time. Although policy makers might wel-
come the weaker currency, the implication is that the earlier 
capital-account regulations were not fully effective in reduc-
ing volatility. Policy makers in Brazil have acknowledged that 
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a 2 or 6 per cent tax is likely not sufficient to reduce inflows 
when local yields are still above 10 per cent.
… but may be more effective when 
coordinated internationally
Brazil’s experience also makes clear that in an era of finan-
cial globalization, it is no longer possible for any individual 
country to fully manage cross-border risk by unilateral ac-
tion. Multilateral cooperation on capital-account regulations 
could be an important element of the international financial 
system. In particular, there is some fear that the implemen-
tation of measures to manage capital flows in one country 
might divert more speculative flows to other countries. 
However, developing countries have argued that evidence 
of negative spillover effects is limited, and that multilateral 
coordination of capital-account regulations and rules would 
serve only to reduce countries’ policy space. Bilateral and re-
gional coordination might be an alternative to global rules. 
In addition, coordination would optimally include policy 
actions in the source countries to help reduce flows from the 
outset. To do so, however, would require reforms of the in-
ternational financial architecture and domestic regulations. 
The more, the merrier
Despite the continued global financial turmoil, progress 
towards the creation of a better regulated financial system 
remains slow. Karel did live to see the day that at least the 
need to enhance the macroeconomic policy toolbox was 
recognized. Mainstream economists erroneously live in a 
world of corner solutions entrenched in macroeconomic 
policy dilemmas and trilemmas. In an imperfect world of un-
certainty and market volatility, there are no corner solutions 
and policy instruments tend to be only partially effective. So, 
defying Tinbergen’s rule of one instrument for one policy 
target, it seems better to have as many tools as possible at 
our disposal. Karel’s writings give lightning examples of how 
to choose among the available tools to serve both objec-
tives of economic stability and broader development in dif-
ferent circumstances. 
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I had the opportunity to work with Karel as part of the 
Money and Finance for Development (MFD) project, im-
plemented at the ISS in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The MFD was an extremely interesting and highly relevant 
project. The hypotheses of the project were insightful and 
innovative: it was argued that different countries, depending 
on their structure and stage of development, have access to 
different types of foreign capital inflows, which in turn tend 
to transmit into the economy through essentially different 
transmission mechanisms and channels, causing different 
macroeconomic effects and triggering different adjustment 
mechanisms during the process. 
For instance, Official Development Aid flows are received 
by governments of poor developing countries and are basi-
cally spent in infrastructure and social programmes, with 
significant effects on domestic absorption, domestic prices 
and exchange rate appreciation. More advanced developing 
economies, on the other hand, tend to be commercial bor-
rowers, and thus have access to financial capital flows com-
ing from private sources. These flows tend to be mediated 
through local financial systems, and thus increase domestic 
absorption by boosting domestic consumption and invest-
ment.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows to poor developing 
economies, by contrast, are controlled by large transnational 
corporations and are allocated to the production of com-
modities for export markets. FDI flows to more advanced 
developing countries are likely to be allocated to the manu-
facturing sector, from which production of goods and servic-
es are partly sold in domestic markets and partly exported.
Thus, countries tend to have access to determined capital 
flows, which in turn will have different transmission mecha-
nisms and will bring about differentiated macroeconomic 
effects. In other words, the structure and development level 
of a country will determine a priori the type of financial flows 
it has access to and consequently the type of macroeco-
nomic transmission mechanism it will experience in response 
to capital flows.
During my professional career, working as an economist, I 
have often came across the phenomenon of external finan-
cial volatility and its destabilizing macroeconomic effects on 
Money and finance for development during the 
1980s and beyond
Luis Carlos Jemio4
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developing country economies. The concepts and theories 
I learned while I was working with Karel on the MFD project 
helped me to understand those effects in a more insight-
ful and precise way. Latin America and Bolivia have been 
exposed to cycles of volatility in the world financial markets 
during the last two decades; each cycle has brought eco-
nomic and social distress. I witnessed the effects of financial 
volatility in developing countries, both as a researcher as 
well as a policy maker, when I served as Minister of Finance 
of Bolivia. At the end of the 1990s, the financial crisis which 
started in Thailand and other Asian countries rapidly trans-
mitted to other regions of the world, including Latin Amer-
ica, with devastating economic and social impacts. Adjust-
ment to shocks proved to be extremely difficult and painful, 
due to the limited capacity countries had at that time to 
implement counter-cyclical policies. During the second half 
of the 2000s external conditions dramatically improved for 
Latin American economies as a result of high export com-
modity prices. However, the current economic prosperity 
does not ensure that the region will not be exposed to finan-
cial volatility again in the future.  
I worked for the MFD project between 1988 and 1993, first 
as a PhD student testing some of the project’s hypotheses 
for the Bolivian case; and second, as a researcher in charge 
of constructing Computational General Equilibrium models 
for the Philippine and Thai economies, which were utilized 
to test the project’s hypotheses for those countries.  
Apart from Karel, other members of the project team at that 
time were Valpy FitzGerald, Rob Vos, Joke Luttik, Fernando 
Tenjo and Edwin Croes, among others. Although Karel did 
not know too much about Latin America, he agreed to be 
my second supervisor during my PhD studies. I will always be 
grateful for the invaluable advice Karel gave me during the 
process of writing my PhD dissertation and during the pe-
riod I worked as researcher for the ISS; I really enjoyed work-
ing with him and learned a lot from him during that period.   
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Part II 
vIetnaM and Poverty 
reductIon
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Vietnam has shown a record of sustained high growth rates 
and spectacular poverty reduction over a period of three 
decades (1980–2010), comparable with China. In this short 
note it will be argued that this was primarily the result of 
the growth model that was chosen at the outset, one which 
used redistributive agrarian reform as its foundation, which 
led to an initial growth spurt stimulated by agricultural out-
put growth, increased rural incomes and finally higher rural 
savings and purchasing power. Only later, in the 1990s, did 
industrialization take the lead, stimulated by foreign direct 
investment in special economic zones, and in industries of 
the main economic growth poles, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City. Because of Vietnam’s initially broad-based economic 
growth model, poverty reduction was widespread, largely 
due to income growth among the rural poor, and much less 
the result of a possible macroeconomic trickle-down effect.
Growth was indeed spectacular, although it needs to be 
emphasized that Vietnam’s economy started at a very low 
level, with high levels of poverty. However, there are few 
other cases in the recent history of development in which a 
country maintained such high growth rates over such a long 
period of time, only to be compared with China (and possi-
bly South Korea from the 1960s onwards) (see Table 1).
Both China and Vietnam followed a comparable process of 
decollectivization in the early 1980s, in which land was con-
tracted out, first to smaller groups or brigades, and shortly 
thereafter to households. In China this was known as the 
household responsibility system; in Vietnam it was known 
initially as the three-contract system. In Vietnam this reform 
caused an initial growth spurt of on average 7.0 per cent 
during the 1981–85 period. This was directly after a period 
in which growth had stagnated, and was possibly even 
negative, following the short-lived border war with China, a 
conflict waged over Vietnam’s intervention in Pol Pot’s Kam-
puchea (Cambodia). Food production was far from sufficient, 
Vietnam: Inclusive growth with poverty reduction?
Max Spoor5
Table 1: GDP Growth/Annum 1980-2010 in Vietnam and 
China
 1981-
85
1986-
90
1991-
95
1996-
00
2001-
05
2005-
10
China 10.8 7.9 12.3 8.6 10.0 11.2
Vietnam 7.0 4.8 8.2 7.0 7.5 7.3
Source: World Economic Outlook Database, IMF (April 2011)
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and when food aid from China stopped in 1980 there were 
serious food shortages, in particular in Hanoi.6 The agrarian 
reform that took place in the late 1970s/early 1980s caused 
the economy to grow rapidly, increased rural incomes and 
savings, but also restored food balances, laying the founda-
tion for Vietnam to become a major rice exporter from the 
late 1980s onwards.
Poverty reduction was equally spectacular. Unfortunately 
no reliable and comparable household data on poverty are 
known for Vietnam earlier than 1993, when the first Living 
Standards Measurement Survey was held, supported by the 
World Bank and UNDP. From the available LSMSs it is noted 
that urban poverty declined (taking the national poverty line 
as threshold) from 25 per cent in 1993 to only 3 per cent in 
2008. Rural poverty fell from 66 per cent to 19 per cent over 
the same period. However, it is suggested here that during 
the 1980s rural poverty had already declined, in spite of the 
still very high level that was measured in the LSMS of 1993. 
The broad-based growth model that was founded in agricul-
tural recovery and growth in the 1980s resulted in the rapid 
reduction of rural poverty, and in that sense the Vietnamese 
growth model was ‘inclusive’.
However, inequality increased substantially, in particular 
during the 1990s. In Vietnam the Gini-coefficient for income 
inequality was estimated at 0.34 in 1992, growing rapidly to 
0.42 in 2001 (see Spoor, 2007). Furthermore, substantial spa-
tial and sectoral inequalities emerged, that were primarily 
caused by differences in access to social services, something 
which is not measured in the money-metric income inequal-
ity measure. Recent work on the Multidimensional Poverty 
Index, which appeared in the latest UNDP Global Human 
Development Report 2010, measuring the number of severe 
deprivations that people might suffer, confirms this. Growth 
since the mid-1990s and beyond has been based to a much 
greater extent on ‘growth poles’ and export industries, and 
therefore has become less inclusive than before. The social 
model of development, which had been quite egalitarian, 
has become much more exclusionary, in spite of Vietnam’s 
spectacular poverty reduction record. This is definitely the 
most important challenge the Vietnamese government is 
confronting, and again is comparable with China, where 
‘building a social countryside’ (meaning overcoming the 
growing rural–urban income and social services gap) has 
become a top priority.
Table 2: Poverty Headcount Vietnam (1993-2008)      
 
          1993 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
 $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population) 64 50 40 24 21 13
$2 a day (PPP) (% of population) 86 78 69 53 48 38
National poverty line (% of population) 58 37 29 20 16 15
Rural poverty line (% of rural population) 66 45 36 25 20 19
Urban poverty line (% of urban population) 25 9 7 4 4 3
World Economic Outlook Database, IMF (April 2011)      
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Poor rural households in developing countries are exposed 
to a variety of risks and Vietnam is no exception. While much 
has been written about the spectacular decline in poverty 
following the launch of the 1986 Doi Moi (renovation) poli-
cies especially in Vietnam’s agricultural sector, far less is 
known about the manner in which rural households deal with 
risk and vulnerability. Income diversification, which may be 
thought of as a risk-management strategy designed to re-
duce ex-ante risk and help smooth incomes, has often been 
advocated as a useful approach. However, relatively little is 
known about the effect of economic policy changes required 
by Vietnam’s renovation process on the income structure of 
rural households. This essay draws on Nghiem (2010) which 
in turn is based on a detailed analysis of micro-data cover-
ing the period 1993 to 2006 to provide an assessment of the 
trends and determinants of income diversification in Viet-
nam’s most important agricultural region, the Mekong River 
Delta (MRD). After a brief review of the key policy changes 
the essay provides a sense of the main patterns in the in-
come structure of households and the factors that drove 
these changes.
In the 1980s, Vietnam was one of the poorest countries in 
the world, characterized by economic stagnation and hun-
ger. Commenting on the Vietnamese economy, Glewwe 
(2004) wrote that ‘there was little indication that the Vietnam-
ese had any hope of raising their level of welfare’. However, 
since the late 1980s, this picture has changed. Based on the 
national poverty line the poverty head count has fallen from 
58 per cent in 1993 to 15 per cent in 2006. This dramatic 
achievement has been ascribed to the success of various 
policy reforms which aimed at replacing central planning 
with a socialist-oriented market economy and opening the 
economy to the rest of the world. In short, enterprises and 
households were allowed greater autonomy in producing 
and trading their products based on market principles. The 
private economic sector was legalized and price controls 
and export restrictions for most goods and services in-
cluding agricultural commodities were removed by 1989. 
Agricultural land, which had been pooled for production in 
cooperatives, was allocated to rural households. A new land 
law in 1993 provided more security and tenure to those who 
had been allocated land.
The empirical evidence gleaned from our analysis of the five 
micro-data sets covering the period 1993 to 2006 shows that 
over time there has been a clear movement away from a 
reliance on riskier farming activities and towards more stable 
non-farming wage activities. In 1993, households allocated 
about 62 per cent of their time to farm self-employment 
while by 2006 this had shrunk to 46 per cent. At the same 
time, non-farming wage employment which accounted 
Risk-management in the Mekong river delta
Le Tan Nghiem and Arjun S. Bedi7
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for about 7 per cent of household time in 1993 rose to 20 
per cent by 2006. While households endowed with more 
educated labour as well as simply more labour regardless 
of education are more likely to make this transition, the 
movement occurred across all expenditure quintiles. The 
pattern suggests that while household capacity does play a 
role in influencing movement out of farming, the bulk of the 
change may be attributed to changes in the price and incen-
tive structure facing all households. 
Turning to poverty and consumption, during this time period 
households in the MRD experienced a doubling of con-
sumption without an increase in inequality. In fact the Gini 
coefficient fell from 0.295 to 0.284 between 1993 and 2006. 
A consumption decomposition exercise shows that about 18 
per cent of the increase in consumption may be attributed 
to increases in household capacity (more education, more 
workers) while the remainder may be attributed to non-
household specific attributes. To emphasize, that is, about 
80 per cent of the change in consumption is due to factors 
that are not particular to a household, but to factors that 
have altered the economic environment in which households 
operate. Of particular interest in terms of isolating an ele-
ment of the change in the economic environment which may 
have played a role is the sharp effect that the increase in rice 
prices (due to removal of internal and external restrictions) 
between 1993 and 1998 had on increasing consumption.
The kind of structural policy changes that have occurred in 
Vietnam since 1986 are not unique to the country. While our 
analysis supports the idea that the changes have had posi-
tive effects these are by no means universal. It is quite pos-
sible and has indeed been recorded elsewhere, that similar 
policy changes in other contexts may have worsened pover-
ty and inequality. Notwithstanding this cautionary note, our 
analysis shows that in the Mekong River Delta over the pe-
riod 1993 to 2006 there has been a shift out of farming activi-
ties and a large increase in household consumption with no 
increase in inequality, and that the bulk of the changes may 
be attributed to the changes in the institutional environment 
facing households. The main insight offered by our analysis 
is that while at a microeconomic level households may adopt 
strategies to reduce their exposure to risk, macroeconomic 
policies which affect all households appear to play a more 
important role in helping households diversify their sources 
of income and potentially smooth their incomes.         
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Part III
It Is MIcro and Macro, 
stuPId!
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Karel Jansen and I had frequent conversations about the na-
ture of the differences between micro and macro economics. 
Karel was a staunch believer in the separate nature of these 
two broad divisions within the economics discipline. As a 
macroeconomist, he was someone with a pragmatist stance. 
In other words, he was neither a Monetarist, New Classicist, 
Keynesian nor neo-Keynesian. He could not be boxed into 
any of these categories, and was a policy-minded macro-
economist. For example in one of his papers on the Thai 
economy’s responses to the financial crisis of 1997 (Jansen, 
2001), he argued that too rigid an adherence to either ex-
change rate or inflation targeting without adopting a flexible 
and discretionary policy stance would be self-defeating. 
Events have borne out his wisdom. 
In my discussions with Karel, I always argued that the older 
micro-macro distinctions were now obsolete because of the 
common theoretical techniques applied: the use of game 
theoretic models of strategic interaction and representa-
tive optimizing agent models were now common to both 
microeconomics and macroeconomics. Nor is it an entirely 
new development; the representative agent smoothing 
consumption in a growth model is an old idea harking back 
to Frank Ramsey (1928), for example. Perhaps the real dif-
ferences between micro and macro lie in the differences 
in policy goals of the two fields. Macroeconomics is more 
concerned with stabilizing the aggregate economy; micro-
economics looks at sectoral issues. Even then, there are 
overlaps when it comes to the determinants of growth, and 
the big questions connected with poverty and inequality.
Moreover, mainstream macroeconomics was until recently 
an area riddled with major ideological differences. These are 
still extant, but are less acute than they were up to the 1980s. 
Underpinning them was the notion of the neo-classical di-
chotomy. Money was a veil; all that monetary policy could do 
was determine the general price level in a simple quantity 
theory of money perspective. Output and employment were 
determined by tastes (private decisions with regard to saving 
and investment) and technology. Markets cleared in the Wal-
rasian sense, and if not, market failure had to be addressed. 
These views were challenged by John Maynard Keynes dur-
ing the great depression of the 1930s, and later by Keynes-
ians. Central to their view was the fact that the economy was 
riddled with rigidities, therefore markets did not clear in the 
‘notional’ sense, and the aggregate economy was character-
ized by generalized excess supply, and output could be in-
creased when aggregate demand was raised. Their view was 
vindicated by the experience of the USA, UK, Australasia 
and Latin America during the Second World War. Secondly, 
and more importantly for the present, Keynesians regard 
money and its alternatives as financial and speculative as-
Micro-macro divides and paradoxes
Syed Mansoob Murshed
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sets, which can have deeply damaging consequences for the 
‘real’ economy when things go wrong, as was the case after 
the global financial crisis of 2008.
As development economists, we are concerned with mak-
ing the economic pie bigger via growth, so that the neces-
sary means for redressing problems in the sphere of human 
development are created. Growth does require a stable 
macroeconomic background (low inflation, manageable 
fiscal and balance of payments deficits). Indeed, this is what 
Milton Friedman, in his famous Presidential address to the 
American Economics Association, asserted was the role of 
monetary policy (Friedman, 1968). Macro-policy instruments 
could not be utilized to lower unemployment beyond its 
natural (market clearing) rate in the long run, otherwise there 
would be accelerating inflation. Ergo, control inflation and 
remove market ‘distortions’. This became the cornerstone of 
the ‘Washington Consensus’ advice to developing countries 
and economies in transition during the structural adjustment 
phase of the 1980s and 1990s, which academics in develop-
ment studies institutes love to berate. Indeed, they did fail 
when accompanied by supply shocks and the absence of 
social safety nets, but particularly when there were major 
financial and currency crises, as was the case in East Asia 
(1997), Russia (1998) and Argentina (2001). It would appear 
that blind faith in market efficiency is a god that failed. But 
why did it? There are many explanations, but one argument 
emanating from the very same stable states that the failure 
of policies was due to malfunctioning institutions. Institu-
tional fundamentalism replaced market fundamentalism 
(Rodrik, 2006).
The financial crisis of 2008, and the (great) recession that 
followed seemed to have restored faith in the efficacy of 
the Keynesian multiplier in policy makers’ minds. And, fis-
cal stimuli seemed to have worked in dampening recession 
when state funds are not used to resuscitate ailing financial 
institutions, as the example of China suggests. Back in the 
1970s James Tobin, when retorting at the monetarist mantra 
of Friedman, had argued that labour market characteristics, 
related to fairness, indicated an inflation-unemployment 
trade-off (Tobin, 1972). More recently George Akerlof and 
Robert Shiller (2009) introduced us to the notion of the 
confidence multiplier during especially severe recessions, 
which requires policy makers to run the extra mile to restore 
confidence.
The differences between micro and macro analysis centre on 
the unit of analysis, the policy goal and above all the policy 
instrument. Paradoxes, however, remain. One example con-
cerns aid effectiveness. In some macroeconomic studies aid 
appears to crowd out domestic resource mobilization. But 
project aid (and even programme aid) seems to be benefi-
cial when it comes to sectors such as health and education. 
Another example is the effect of remittances (a subject Karel 
worked on in his last years). Remittances can cause harmful 
exchange rate appreciation that erodes competiveness, yet 
paradoxically at the same time lift millions of families out of 
poverty. Furthermore, growth in the presence of very high 
inequality is less poverty reducing. Karel would agree that 
in the final analysis, all’s well that ends well; economic policy 
making has to be simultaneously watchful at both micro and 
macro levels. 
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Introduction
Remittances have positive impacts on many economic indi-
cators. The loss of competitiveness is, however, a drawback 
with possible long-term negative effects. Remittances often 
explain a relatively poor export performance and may, in 
the longer term, limit the diversification of the economy and 
productivity growth. It is therefore understandable that pol-
icy makers are looking for ways of mitigating this effect, but 
the basis for such actions are at times difficult to measure. 
Most studies point to immediate and significant effects of 
surges in remittances on exchange rates. Another area which 
can be affected is the labour market: emigration and remit-
tances may lead to Dutch disease effects in labour markets 
(Chami et al. 2003; Mishra 2006; Yabuuchi and Chauduri 
2007; Yang 2008).9 Wages tend to increase following increase 
in remittances.  The rise in remittances  tend to induce 
households to supply less labour or reduce work. Labour 
productivity may rise as emigration reduces unemployment  
(Fagerberg et al. 2004). These findings suggest that the re-
lationship between changes in emigration and remittances 
could be significant. However, such relationships are often 
difficult to assess (Fagerberg et al. 2004).  Research linking 
the literature on Dutch disease in remittances with labour 
market effects to assess the total impact of outmigration and 
remittances on competitiveness is therefore crucial.  
In the Philippines, Bayangos and Jansen (2011) found that 
an increase in remittance inflows increased consumption, 
investment, labour productivity and economic growth. But 
it also leads to a change in the economic structure, in par-
ticular a decline in traded goods production and exports. An 
important contribution of this study is a careful but insightful 
analysis of the channels along which migration and remit-
tances affect the competitiveness of the economy through 
the unit labour cost of exports. 
Remittances and competitiveness:  
Tracing the relationship through 
a unit labour cost analysis
Veronica B. Bayangos8 
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Using labour unit cost as a coherent 
measure of competitiveness 
We can bring together the various channels through which 
remittances affect competitiveness in the unit labour cost in 
equation 1.
ULC = wLVA/P . 1e = wa/P . 1e       (1)
Unit labour cost (ULC) in US dollars is the product of the 
nominal wage rate (w) and the (inverse of) physical labour 
productivity (employment, L, over the volume of output, VA, 
deflated by the value added deflator, P), and the exchange 
rate, e, the number of local currency units per one dollar.
The growth of unit labour cost in equation 2 is then the sum 
of:
gULC = (gw − ga )+ (gP − ge )         (2)
where gi is the growth rate of wages, labour productivity, 
prices and the exchange rate respectively.10 This equation 
allows us to assess the relative importance of the various 
channels linking remittances to competitiveness. The first 
two terms (gw – ga) capture the change in labour cost: remit-
tances increase wages and affect labour productivity. 
The second term (gp – ge) captures the real exchange rate 
effect. The increase in prices reduces competitiveness and 
the change in the nominal exchange rate will add to this: a 
depreciation would compensate for the price increase but 
an appreciation would further erode competitiveness.
To determine the relevance of the unit labour cost frame-
work, Bayangos and Jansen (2011) used estimates from a 
dynamic open macroeconometric model for the Philippines. 
The findings not only show some impact on the nominal 
and real exchange rate but also show that the labour market 
effects are highly significant. Emigration cuts into the labour 
force and the receipt of remittances further reduces labour 
supply. There is a strong effect on wages. The impact of 
the higher wages on competitiveness is mitigated by the 
increase in labour productivity. As the labour force falls and 
output rises there is a more intensive use of labour through 
a decline in unemployment and underemployment.11 The 
results clearly show that it is important to include the labour 
market channel in the analysis of competitiveness. Other 
studies that exclusively focus on the Dutch disease channel 
thus miss an important additional element affecting a coun-
try’s export performance.
Conclusion: policy implications for 
economic authorities 
Remittances have many positive effects for the Philippines. 
There are, however, implications for the Philippine authori-
ties. Tax policy could be used to soften the impact of rising 
wage costs but the scope for reducing income taxes is limit-
ed in the Philippines: personal income tax revenue accounts 
for only 1.5 per cent of GDP.
Monetary authorities may consider the exchange rate effects 
when setting the policy interest rate. The increase in remit-
tances narrows the output gap and this pushes inflation up. 
The central bank may react by increasing the policy rate but 
the increase in interest rates may attract more remittances 
and other capital inflows that may result in a further appre-
ciation of the nominal exchange rate. 
An alternative strategy for the central bank would be to 
intervene in the market to buy up foreign exchange and so 
regulate excessive movements of the exchange rate. This 
would lead to an accumulation of international reserves and 
an expansion of the money supply. Usually central banks 
sterilize these money supply effects to control inflation but 
such an approach tends to be quite costly as the earnings 
on the international reserves are less than the cost of sterili-
zation.
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Standard macroeconomic policy may thus be rather limited 
in dealing with the competitiveness problem. There is a 
need for more structural policies to enhance productivity, in-
cluding investment in infrastructure and education, reforms 
to increase competition on domestic markets, and export 
promotion and diversification.
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Part Iv
Global InstItutIons 
under FIre
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In May 2011 the international community, under the auspices 
of the UN, gathered for the fourth time in forty years to as-
sess progress made by the least developed country (LDC) 
group. ‘LDC’ was proving a grim label, marking a stagnant 
and non-evolving category, whose membership has not de-
clined for most of its lifespan. The main goals of the confer-
ence, which took place in Istanbul, were: ‘(a) to reverse the 
marginalization of LDCs…. and to help them catch up; (b) 
to support a pattern of accelerated and sustained economic 
growth…; and (c) to help LDCs graduate from LDC status’ 
(UNCTAD, 2010: 83). To achieve this, the Istanbul Pro-
gramme of Action was adopted. Like much of the literature 
on LDCs (for example, Guillaumont, 2009; UN, 2001; UNCDP, 
2008; UNCTAD’s LDC Reports 1984–2010), the Plan’s focus 
on goodwill and technicalities impedes it from questioning 
and problematizing the assumptions underlying the LDC 
category.12 The Istanbul outcome document fails to address 
political economy issues and, hence, cannot represent a true 
overhaul effort. It does not consider either the distribution of 
power or the costs and benefits borne by the actors involved 
(Cornia, 2011: 15).
The official narrative is that donors should provide these 
countries with special benefits, given their disadvantaged 
position in the world economy (UNCDP, 2008: v). This should 
enable them to ‘catch up’ and, as a result, ensure a more 
level playing field in the arena where countries engage 
with one another. Thus, a declining number of LDCs is the 
ultimate aim of the category. This has not been achieved. 
Today, forty years after the establishment of the category, 
only three countries have graduated from it,13 representing a 
disappointing 6 per cent success rate.
From the initial twenty-five LDCs identified in 1971, the cat-
egory grew to a total of fifty-one countries;14 membership 
then fell to forty-eight, following the three graduation cases 
already mentioned. The group still comprises forty-eight 
countries, spanning three regions (see Table below), with 
Africa assuming the lead: thirty-three out of the forty-eight 
LDCs are African countries, representing 68.7 per cent of the 
total.
This essay provides a brief first attempt to hypothesize about 
the decision-making process that supported the creation of 
the LDC category, in an effort to: (i) understand the context 
The least developed country (LDC) category: Appeasing 
voices of discontent
Djalita Fialho
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in which the category was created; and (ii) position it within 
broader changes in political economy and the structure of 
capital, institutions and power.
Stating some of the facts
During the 1960s and 1970s — the period of initial debate 
on creating the LDC category — an important change was 
taking place within UN membership: an increase in the num-
ber and voice of Third World countries and, consequently, 
the call for a New International Economic Order.15 Before 
this, many developing countries were powerless colonies: 
during this period they gained independence and took 
more control over their development. They also gained the 
majority of votes in the UN, thereby making it less impor-
tant, since hegemonic powers would no longer deal with an 
organization in which they did not control the majority. It was 
a period of optimism, where newly independent countries 
successfully strove for development (economic growth was 
quite positive, even in most of sub-Saharan Africa), often-
Fig. 1 Map of the current 48 LDCs in 2011. Red dots indicate the countries that have graduated from LDC status
source: www.wikipedia.org
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Africa Asia and the Pacific Latin America and the Caribbean
Angola Afghanistan Haiti
Benin Bangladesh
Burkina Faso Bhutan
Burundi Cambodia
Central African Republic Kiribati
Chad Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Comoros Myanmar
Democratic Republic of the Congo Nepal
Djibouti Samoa
Equatorial Guinea Solomon Islands
Eritrea Timor-Leste
Ethiopia Tuvalu
Gambia Vanuatu
Guinea Yemen
Guinea-Bissau
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Rwanda
São Tomé and Príncipe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Togo
Uganda
United Republic of Tanzania
Zambia
Source: United Nations
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times supported by the conviction that rich countries owed 
them for the long period of colonial repression.
It is also during this period that the aid industry was consoli-
dated and the creation of the LDC category can be seen as 
another example of international actions aimed at managing 
global development. This aim had gained cohesiveness with 
the creation of the UN in 1945 — today an umbrella organi-
zation for all things related to development, among other ar-
eas of intervention. Establishment of the LDC category took 
place during ‘the golden age of “development planning” … 
during which the international community strove to project 
Keynesian liberalism from the domestic to the international 
arena’ (Thérien, 2002: 239).
A host of new bodies and agencies was created in the 
1960s and 1970s. The UN proclaimed the First and Second 
Development Decades (1961 and 1971, respectively), con-
vened the first UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) (1964), created the UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) (1965) and the UN Industrial Development Organiza-
tion (UNIDO) (1967) and adopted the Declaration on the Es-
tablishment of a New International Economic Order (1974). 
The World Bank created the International Development 
Association (1960); the IMF established its compensatory 
financing facility (1963); Part IV of the GATT was integrated 
into this General Agreement (1965) (paving the way for the 
generalized system of preferences) and the joint IMF-World 
Bank Development Committee was established (1974) (Thé-
rien, 2002: 239). These initiatives were framed according to 
the understanding that economic growth and development 
obeyed a rather mechanical and straightforward process, an-
chored in the conviction that foreign aid to poorer countries 
was sure to bear fruit.
Connected to this is the fact that dominant postwar devel-
opment theories were ‘ideologically linked to generalised 
capitalist interests … as well as to more particular US inter-
ests in maintaining its hegemonic global position in eco-
nomic, political and military terms’ (Brohman, 1995: 133). The 
link between modernization theory and US national inter-
ests, particularly towards the global expansion of capitalism 
and the promotion of a self-serving worldview, did not go 
unnoticed (ibid.) and should also be recognized in the LDC 
context.
In concluding … sort of
In the years that preceded the decision to create the LDC 
category, the idea of a homogeneous Third World, under-
stood as the failed version of the ideal industrialized First 
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World, was very much present. This was the image that 
provided the most powerful set of assumptions about the 
poorest part of the world, believed to be in need of (indus-
trialization-focused) development intervention. Third World 
economic problems were ‘understood primarily as technical 
problems that [could] be overcome by the right mix of ad-
vice, investment, aid and liberal reform’ (Berger, 1994: 270; 
see also Escobar, 1988; Ferguson, 1990, 1994; Payne, 2001, 
2005).
The underlying principle of the LDC category seemed to fit 
into this line of reasoning, although it represented some-
thing of a step beyond the simplistic First/Third World di-
chotomy since, to some extent, it did de-homogenize the 
Third World by creating a sub-group within it. In addition, it 
also recognized (mostly in its narrative) some of the salient 
processes that perpetuate uneven development. Yet, other 
‘worlds’ were left untouched, indicating that the prevailing 
international order remained essentially intact. Basically, 
this meant that the status quo was undisturbed, as was the 
global balance of power.
Establishing the LDC category did not significantly upset the 
interests of either the developed world or more advanced 
developing countries. In particular donors, by endorsing a 
narrative showcasing the altruistic prioritization of assistance 
to LDCs (without a legally-binding obligation to implement 
it; as reflected by the low number of graduations to date), 
simply appeased those who spoke out against the status 
quo — but without having to meaningfully change it or to 
relinquish power.
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Introduction
In a recent article, Adam Kessler (2010) advanced the socio-
psychological concept of cognitive dissonance for explain-
ing the response of many academics, namely those he calls 
believers in laissez faire, to the recent global and financial 
crisis. According to Kessler: ‘Cognitive dissonance theory 
predicts that when real-world events “disconform” deeply 
held beliefs this creates psychological discomfort in persons 
and they will respond by means of distortion and denial’ 
(2010: 2). Whilst reading this article I was reminded of a 
similar phenomenon I observed with respect to IMF (and 
other orthodox) economists explaining inflation in Suriname, 
raising in my mind the question of whether the explanations 
represented cognitive dissonance or plain old-fashioned 
duplicity.
IMF economists explaining inflation 
in Suriname
It is generally accepted that over the last twenty years, i.e., 
since the economy was liberalized, Suriname has experi-
enced two high inflation episodes; 1992–5 and 1999–2001.  
In the former period average inflation was 198% and in the 
latter 66%.  The standard argument, advanced by successive 
IMF policy review missions to Suriname, is that inflation in 
general, and in these two periods in particular, was due to 
excessive money stock growth resulting from the monetiza-
tion of fiscal excesses — printing money to fund the budget 
deficit. For example, in the early pages of the 2005 IMF 
country report one reads that:
The volatility of fiscal revenues from the bauxite 
sector has contributed significantly to macroeco-
nomic instability in Suriname. During the 1990s, the 
large movements of world aluminium prices caused 
The IMF explaining inflation in Suriname: A case of 
cognitive dissonance or plain 
old-fashioned duplicity? 
Howard Nicholas
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similar swings in fiscal revenue and the overall fiscal 
balance. These were combined with pro-cyclical 
fiscal expenditure policy responses that accentu-
ated the terms of trade volatility, and the ensuing 
shortfalls in financing were monetized. This, in turn, 
caused rapid price inflation and exchange rate de-
preciation (IMF, 2005:4 emphasis added).
To be clear, the argument here is that inflation in Suriname 
results from inflationary financing of the deficit. In another 
IMF country report some years later, Fritz-Krockow et al. 
(2009: 4) echoed this argument stating that: ‘High rates of 
monetary expansion… were the main factor underlying the 
first near-hyperinflation episode in the early 1990s’; and ‘The 
sharp fiscal deterioration in 1998–99 was the main cause of 
the second near-hyperinflation episode’.
When excess broad money stock (M2) growth is plotted 
against consumer price inflation it would indeed appear 
at first sight that this argument has merit (see Fig. 1).16  
However, close scrutiny of the chart, particularly the period 
1999–2001, would seem to cast doubt on the implied causal 
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relationship between the two variables since, on a number 
of occasions, inflation appears to rise or fall before corre-
sponding changes in excess money stock. 
Fig. 1: Inflation and excess broad money stock (M2) chang-
es in Suriname, 1989–2007
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The reality
If excess money stock is not driving inflation, what is? The 
answer is actually quite straightforward. It is import prices, 
and especially changes in the exchange rate. As Fig. 2 indi-
cates, the co-movement of inflation and the exchange rate 
is exceedingly close. Changes in the exchange rate give rise 
to changes in import prices, and these in turn to changes in 
prices of domestically consumed products. This should not 
really be surprising given the small size of the Surinamese 
economy and its considerable openness. Moreover, to the 
extent that money stock changes accompany domestic price 
changes, it can only mean that the former are the result and 
not the cause of the latter.
Fig 2: Inflation and exchange rate movements in Suriname, 
1989–2007
Source: IMF Suriname Country Reports, various years
Bizarrely, these relationships are also recognized by the 
authors of the IMF reports quoted above.  In the 2005 IMF 
report, only a few pages after claiming that the primary 
cause of inflation in Suriname has been the fiscally induced 
excessive growth in broad money stock, it is stated that:  
In each episode of high inflation, broad money 
growth rose with a lag. An econometric analysis 
also suggests that the causality runs from exchange 
rate or inflation to money growth. This is consist-
ent with a hypothesis that the monetary authorities 
accommodate inflation expectations that have al-
ready been reflected in the exchange rate and the 
price level (IMF, 2005: 13).
Similarly, the authors of the 2009 IMF report note a few pag-
es after they too contend that inflation is caused by excess 
money growth, that:
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Expectations drive monetary policy transmission 
in Suriname, as inflation and exchange rate move-
ments lead to [sic] changes in monetary aggre-
gates. This can be explained by the fact that shocks 
to the terms of trade or to the level of government 
spending are known well before their effects on 
fiscal deficits and therefore are reflected in higher 
prices before they affect money growth (Fritz-
Krockow et al., 2009: 12).
In other words, in both reports, while it is accepted that the 
empirical evidence shows money stock changes following 
changes in inflation, to keep with the faith, so to speak, it 
is claimed that individuals know that the authorities will ac-
commodate currency depreciation and resulting higher do-
mestic money prices so they bid up these prices whenever 
there is a depreciation of the currency. Apart from noting the 
absurdity of this presumption, it also implies that, for these 
authors, standard empirical tests of causality (e.g., Granger 
causality tests) are basically irrelevant when it comes to prov-
ing or disproving the orthodox (IMF) view of inflation. For 
them inflation is deemed to be caused by changes in money 
supply whether or not the latter precedes the former.  
A case of cognitive dissonance or 
plain old-fashioned duplicity?
In the literature on inflation the preceding discussion can 
also be understood in terms of the debate over whether 
money stock change is exogenous or endogenous. Ortho-
dox economists have long argued, and many continue to 
argue, that money stock changes are exogenous and the 
fundamental cause of inflation. Others, including a growing 
number of orthodox economists (bowing to the increasing 
volume of evidence) see money stock changes as mostly en-
dogenous, with these changes largely accommodating infla-
tionary impulses. The authors of the above mentioned IMF 
reports appear to be among those orthodox economists 
who refuse to accept the apparent implications of real world 
evidence in respect of money stock changes and inflation 
when it contradicts the analytical foundations of their policy 
recommendations. One could say, as Kessler’s logic would 
have us argue, that this represents cognitive dissonance on 
the part of these economists. However, one could also argue 
that it is yet another example of the well-known and widely 
practised duplicity of the IMF and other multilateral financial 
organizations in their dealings with developing countries. 
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Karel and I shared a concern with real economies, with how 
economies or countries are doing and how this can be ex-
plained. Karel studied the role of external finance in devel-
opment extensively, and was also interested in debt crises. 
I was pleased to hear, a few years ago, that he had enjoyed 
reading my study of debt relief for the Dutch Policy and Op-
erations Evaluation Department (IOB, 2003). I am sure Karel 
was also following the Greek crisis with great interest. In this 
contribution I would like to bring the two topics together. 
The aim is to shed some light on policy options for dealing 
with the Greek debt problems, using a political economy 
perspective as well as insights from sovereign debt crises of 
developing countries.
Around the middle of 2010, policy makers began to rec-
ognize that Greece could no longer pay its public debt 
service. The European Commission, together with the IMF, 
decided to assemble a rescue package of €110 billion on 
the condition that Greece would implement an adjustment 
programme designed with and monitored by the IMF. About 
a year later, the Greek government announced that the 
country was still not able to finance its creditors. This led to 
a debate on the best course of action. One view holds that 
the EU should make additional financing available, but that 
Greece should then be forced to implement the adjustment 
programme agreed with the IMF, which includes spending 
cuts, pension and tax reforms, and privatizations. EU Minis-
ters of Finance expressed concerns about the slow imple-
mentation of these policy conditions. According to another 
view, however, the IMF programme, even if implemented, 
will not solve the crisis. The adjustment programme itself is 
so harsh and will affect economic growth so negatively that 
the country will not be able to pay its debt. New money will 
only postpone an unavoidable restructuring of the debt. A 
third opinion is that the EU should end its involvement in 
Greece and that the country should exit the euro zone.
This debate has a lot in common with the debate on debt 
relief to developing countries at the end of the 1990s. There 
is an economic aspect to this debate, revolving around the 
question of whether the countries concerned have a (tempo-
rary) liquidity problem or a solvency problem. But perhaps 
more importantly, the debate is political. It is about power 
and interests: interests of European/Western governments, 
interests of banks and other financial institutions, of the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF, and of the govern-
Perspectives on the Greek debt crisis: Lessons from 
earlier debt crises
Geske Dijkstra17 
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ment and the people of debtor countries. For this reason, 
international political economy theories provide helpful per-
spectives on the debate. 
Following Steinwand and Stone (2008), three perspectives 
can be distinguished: functionalist, structuralist and public 
choice. Functionalists are in favour of international coopera-
tion and see the IMF as an institution that reduces transac-
tion costs in that cooperation. By assessing the capacity and 
willingness to pay of countries with debt problems, and by 
designing and monitoring an adjustment programme, the 
IMF reduces search, bargaining and enforcement costs. For 
this reason, an IMF programme has always been a condition 
for debt rescheduling. European governments wanted the 
IMF to be involved in Greece as well.
But functionalists also highlight unintended and negative ef-
fects of international cooperation, in this case, for example, 
possible moral hazard of the debtor. Once a debt resched-
uling or loan package is in place, the incentives to imple-
ment it may be reduced. This current concern about Greece 
has also been voiced by academic authors on the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) at the end of the 1990s. 
According to Easterly (2002), debt relief to the HIPCs did 
not solve the debt problem because these countries contin-
ued to implement bad policies. Empirical studies show that 
at least until around 2000, debt relief had mostly gone to 
countries with bad governance (Depetris Chauvin and Kraay, 
2006; Neumayer, 2002). This means that, at least during the 
1980s and 1990s, the IMF was relatively ineffective as moni-
tor of adjustment policies.
The structuralist view emphasizes the role of power and 
powerful states in international decisions. In this view, deal-
ing with debt problems reflects the interests of the creditors 
and of capital, and not the interests of the people in the 
affected countries. It is argued that the burden of the cur-
rent adjustment programme in Greece falls solely on the 
population, while Western governments are partly to blame 
for the Greek debt problems. For example, part of the debt 
problems stem from Western governments forcing Greece 
to purchase expensive products from their suppliers (see I. 
Beugel in NRC, 28 May 2011). 
According to Daseking and Powell (1999), the combination 
of some debt rescheduling with new loans and grants in 
the 1990s served the interests of the creditor countries, be-
cause they did not have to allocate a large part of their aid 
budgets to debt cancellations. In addition, it can be argued 
that creditor countries benefited from maintaining large 
debt stocks in these countries as this would give them, via 
the IMF, continued leverage on policies — much more than 
if the debts of the poor countries had been cleared earlier. 
The IMF involvement furthered the interests of the business 
sector in the rich countries, for example by ensuring trade 
liberalization and capital account liberalization.
The public choice perspective focuses on rent seeking, prin-
cipal–agent relationships and incentives. Applied to debt 
crises, this view stresses the interests of the IMF itself and of 
other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in (maintain-
ing) debt problems. For example, the recent crises have in 
common with previous debt crises that they allow the IMF 
to overcome its own existential crisis (Dreher, 2004; Vaubel, 
1991). During the 1990s and the early 2000s, the IFIs con-
tinued lending to countries with unsustainable debts. As 
preferred creditors, they were always paid, which induced 
moral hazard. This perpetuated the debt problems and ne-
cessitated far-reaching and costly debt relief on multilateral 
debts (Dijkstra, 2008). The IMF was also relatively ineffective 
as monitor of debtor countries’ policies, due to the fact that 
it had two incompatible roles: that of monitor  and creditor. 
As creditor the IMF had an interest in new IMF programmes: 
they freed the way for new loans and grants from other 
creditors and donors, with which earlier IMF loans could be 
repaid (White and Dijkstra, 2003). In the Greek crisis, it has 
been argued that the ECB also combines these incompat-
ible roles (see www.ft.com/greece, accessed 13 June 2011). 
The ECB is an important negotiator on behalf of the Europe-
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an countries but is also a creditor and as such has an interest 
in new loans.
Applying different political economy perspectives does not 
lead to a straightforward conclusion, but it does help to 
counter the seemingly dominant view that the adjustment 
burden should only be on Greece and the Greek population.
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The current wave of globalization, starting around 1999–
2000, has had profound effects on the labour market and 
on the employment situation of workers all over the world. 
These effects are in many cases accentuated by the current 
financial and economic crisis. 
A major question is whether ongoing analyses on employ-
ment, inequality and globalization remain relevant in the 
context of the large financial and economic crisis. Such anal-
yses do remain highly relevant, for at least two reasons. First-
ly, several elements of the ongoing process of globalization, 
especially unfettered markets (including the labour market) 
and growing inequality (leading many households to indebt 
themselves in order maintain spending on basic needs) 
have given rise to the current crisis (van der Hoeven, 2010). 
Secondly, there is growing evidence that the employment, 
human and social effects of the financial and economic 
crises will last for some time, especially if no corrective ac-
tion is taken. Many analysts foresee that the deceleration or 
decline in GDP growth will lead to rising unemployment that 
lasts much longer than the deceleration or decline in GDP 
itself  (van der Hoeven and Luebker 2007, and Reinhardt and 
Rogoff, 2009). 
There are thus powerful reasons to include policies for em-
ployment, income inequality and human development as 
combined priority issues in designing short-term and longer-
term policies to deal with the crisis. 
According to the dominant view during the current process 
of globalization, unfettered markets are judged sufficient to 
ensure economic efficiency. The implication of the Keynesian 
rigid-wage theory is very invidious but very pervasive: get rid 
of the rigid wages, and let labour markets be more ‘flexible’. 
But imposing more wage flexibility can result in exacerbat-
ing the underlying problem of lack of aggregate demand. 
Stiglitz  (2009)  states the nature of the problem that we face 
today as follows: ‘The people in the global economy have 
the same skills as before the crisis, and the machines and 
real resources are the same as before the crisis. The problem 
is that there is an organizational failure, a coordination fail-
ure, and a macroeconomic failure’. 
The current recession/crisis affects developing countries 
more than previous crises did. World Bank (2010) argues that 
this recession is far more severe than earlier recessions. The 
decline in trade volumes and values, the substantial shrink-
Financial globalization and the current labour market crisis in 
developing countries
Rolph van der Hoeven 
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ing of foreign direct investment as well as a reversal in the 
fast-growing trend of increasing remittances, which some 
have labelled de-globalization, have all had substantial con-
sequences for developing countries and especially for the 
poorer segments of the population. One could argue that 
such de-globalization might be beneficial for developing 
countries as it reverses the trend of increasing globalization. 
Indeed, the current crisis has led to somewhat greater influ-
ence in economic decision making for the larger developing 
countries, for example in the reborn G20 which is replac-
ing the G7; but this is far from the level of change in global 
governance which will be necessary to avoid future crises. 
Furthermore the declines in trade, FDI and remittances were 
not the consequence of any agreed change in international 
policy attitudes towards globalization, but rather the result 
of a  serious downturn in GDP in industrialized countries, 
accompanied by rising tendencies for protectionism and a 
deterioration of attitudes to foreign workers. 
The position of labour in the current crisis is actually ex-
tremely worrying. Most workers did not profit from the bub-
ble (as attested to, for example, by low employment elas-
ticities, growing inequality and persistent informalization), 
but many workers are suffering the consequences of the 
bursting of the bubble (see ILO , 2010). And while business 
goes on as usual in financial institutions, including the highly 
skewed remuneration packages, this is not the case for many 
in the labour market. There has been a substantial increase 
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in the number of households in poverty as a consequence of 
the crisis caused by or combined with a lag in employment 
recovery after a financial crisis. 
In short: current globalization has made labour more precari-
ous, a trend which has been magnified by the current crisis. 
This picture is consistent with the policy reaction in many 
countries to the crisis, to the effect that governments have 
(rightly) acted as banker of last resort to avoid the collapse 
of the financial system, but that governments, despite stimu-
lus plans, monetary easing and some labour market policies, 
have not really acted as employer of last resort. 
It thus seems important to base policies favouring labour in 
the current context on two essential elements (van der Ho-
even, 2010): first, introducing or strengthening those nation-
al and international policies which try to undo the trends of 
precariousness and increasing inequality as a consequence 
of (financial) globalization; second, in addition to the policies 
above, applying special policies to deal with the fallout of 
the current crisis, such as employment policy schemes, spe-
cial labour market policies, cash transfers, etc. 
The costs of these policies are often a fraction of the support 
the financial institutions and large industries have received 
recently. They can be financed initially as part of the current 
stimulus packages and, once the economy has picked up, 
from increased tax revenues or from reimbursements to the 
governments by bailed-out financial institutions.
It is even more important, however, to base policy interven-
tions simultaneously on policies dealing with the structural 
problems which financial globalization has caused, and on 
policies assisting those who fall into poverty or experience 
poor working conditions as a consequence of the crisis; 
the current crisis is clearly the outcome of a longer trend of 
financial globalization, which, if not arrested in its current 
form, may well lead to a new crisis. 
In his assessment of the situation in Thailand in his latest 
work, Karel Jansen was more than aware of all this. He con-
cluded: ‘Although the current Thai political conflict is highly 
complex, certainly one element in it is the confrontation 
between the “haves” and the “have-nots”’ (Jansen, 2011, 
p.262).
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In the very early phase of the 2008-09 world trade collapse, 
policy makers pointed directly to trade finance as a major 
channel for the transmission of the financial sector problems 
into the real economy, inducing significant reductions in 
import and export volumes all around the world. With hind-
sight, that assessment — wrong as it has proved to be — 
was to be expected. With credit in short supply and banks in 
serious trouble, trade finance was set to decline sharply as 
had happened in other financial crises. Moreover, after the 
experiences of the Asian and Dotcom crises, policy makers 
were keenly aware of the vulnerability of trade finance in 
times of crisis and, consequently, of imports and exports that 
to a large extent depend on trade finance. 
One might say that international cooperation within the 
G20 and policy preparation at the WTO occurred in the 
slipstream of these earlier crises, as working groups of inter-
national experts were formed that had hands-on experience. 
Indeed, the networks of policy makers and the procedures 
for international cooperation and assessment by experts had 
their roots in the collapse of trade credit during these earlier 
periods and in the Working Group on Trade, Development 
and Finance. (One particularly relevant project was the 
Aid-for-Trade Initiative that aimed to reduce barriers to the 
integration of developing countries in the world economy 
and to deal with the shortage of trade finance and the lack 
of guarantee infrastructures for developing countries.) Policy 
makers at the international institutions were therefore well 
prepared to put together financial packages and arrange-
ments that could supply public trade finance. But were the 
trade analysts in the international organizations right this 
time in their assessment of the cause? Or was this a case of 
policy analysts trying to promote a pre-cooked policy recipe 
and use the crisis as a valuable marketing instrument? Were 
politicians perhaps interested because trade finance is a way 
to help national exporting firms? Was this an area in which 
highly visible gestures were possible at small costs?  
These are nagging questions, indeed, and they formed the 
very lively basis for teaching international financial reform in 
Karel Jansen’s pet course at ISS: course 4312. Teaching topi-
cal issues such as the financial crisis takes a lot of energy and 
preparation, as lectures constantly have to be updated and 
changed, but it is also highly rewarding. 
It is important to note that when we started teaching on the 
“2008-20?? Financial Crisis”, there were actually no data 
available to check whether the idea of the trade finance 
collapse made any sense at all. In 2004 the Bank of Interna-
tional Settlement (BIS) had discontinued its trade finance 
series. Given that no real time data were available in early 
2009, our assessment was that senior policy makers and 
T he dog that barked
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senior analysts basically appear to have believed that a trade 
finance squeeze was taking place but that the evidence on 
which their convictions were based could only have been 
anecdotal — at best. Interestingly, two years later, in March 
2011, IMF research started to play down the importance of 
trade finance as a cause of the world trade collapse (Nicul-
cea et al., 2011).
That tactical withdrawal was still some way off in 2009, when 
the IMF was involved in several attempts to collect data from 
key financial institutions. Surveys during the early phase of 
the world trade collapse tried to estimate the deficiency 
of trade finance; the prognoses converged to a gap in the 
order of magnitude of a few hundred billion US dollars. This 
‘gap’ provided a stimulus for policy proposals to restore the 
availability of trade finance. The April 2009 meeting of the 
G20 took action and announced additional trade financing. 
The G20 Trade Finance Expert Group estimated potential 
public support by August 2009 to the tune of $400 billion. 
One key issue in course 4312 was that policy makers and 
analysts had got the causality completely wrong in 2008–09. 
Their analytic approach was a supply side analysis which 
claimed that a reduction in the availability of finance and 
credit due to the problems in the banking sector triggered 
the trade collapse. This argumentation completely ignored 
the demand side analysis, namely that a reduction in trade 
will reduce the demand for trade finance and credit. 
We do not have data on actual volumes but the Sherlock 
Holmes of economics can still find the clues to solve this 
puzzle. He can, for example, take a look at the amount of 
trade-related inter-bank messages exchanged via the SWIFT 
system and see that trade started to decline before trade 
credit activity did. Holmes will also take note that the G20 
Trade Finance Expert Group in its August 2009 report con-
cluded that ‘banks and buyers have utilised on aggregate 
approximately 63 per cent of the G20’s commitment capac-
ity in the first six months’, and he will note that crowding out 
of private trade finance by official export credit agencies 
pushed up that percentage substantially — indeed supply 
seems to have exceeded demand. To this list of circum-
stantial evidence he will add the empirical puzzles in the 
literature: for instance, in the OECD global trade model that 
features a measure for financial tightness, forecasting errors 
increase when the forecasting horizon decreases.  Equally 
puzzling is the fact that one of the key studies in the field 
‘The Collapse of International Trade During the 2008–2009 
Crisis: In Search of a Smoking Gun’ by Levchenko, Lewis and 
Tesar (2009), finds no evidence at the firm level that either 
exports or imports were reduced more strongly in sectors 
where trade credit is relatively important. Holmes will cer-
tainly be interested in the simulation results of this paper 
that suggest a counterintuitive increase of imports due to a 
marginally lower level of trade finance.
Elementary, dear Watson: ‘It’s the demand side, stupid!’
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